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Getting Out: 
An Investigation into the Failures of the New Orleans Hurricane Katrina Evacuation Process and 
What Could Have Been Done Differently 
 
Found in the New Orleans City Archives’ Mayor Nagin Collection is a letter written to 
the mayor in 2004 detailing concerns about the sustainability of the city, in the event of a 
Hurricane.1  The letter was written by George H. Troxell Jr., a West Point graduate with a 
Masters in Engineering from the University of Illinois.2  Mr. Troxell, in retirement at the time of 
the letter, during his career worked for an oil company in Belgium.3  His role at the company was 
to design and engineer the oil rigs to be able to withstand the rough seas, and waves that 
sometimes reached close to 100 feet in height.4  In his letter to the mayor, Mr. Troxell expressed 
his concern that New Orleans was woefully underprepared for a hurricane and, the letter opens 
with the line, “Once again we have been reminded by a front page article in The Times-Picayune 
of the fact that New Orleans is a potential death trap in the event of a hurricane of the wrong path 
and intensity.”5  This underscores Mr. Troxell’s concern which he goes on to express.  He 
believed that the levees, pumps and drainage systems were not up to the task of keeping the city 
dry in the event of a major storm.6  In an urgent plea, Mr. Troxell called for the mayor to launch 
an investigation, in conjunction with the Army Corp of Engineers and private firms to ensure that 
New Orleans was safe and “so that mass evacuation is not a requisite for survival.”7  While it is 
                                                           
1 George H. Troxell Jr., letter to New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, July 26, 2004. 
2 George H. Troxell III, phone conversation with the author, June 5, 2017. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Troxell Jr. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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now clear the warnings in this letter were not heeded, the line about mas evacuation being a 
requisite for survival turned out to be shockingly prophetic. 
Although the unprecedented physical damage was unavoidable, the loss of life was not.  
Had everyone been properly evacuated, no one would have died.  While it is clear that it is nearly 
impossible to completely vacate a major American city, steps can be taken to be sure the highest 
number of people possible get out, steps Mayor Nagin did not take.   
The evacuation process in the leadup to Katrina’s landfall has been studied for problems 
and inefficiencies.  The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina can teach government officials and citizens 
of coastal communities many valuable lessons, and for this reason it is crucial to revisit that 
catastrophe and study the mistakes made.  This investigation explores several key questions.  
Were the evacuations, both the voluntary and mandatory, declared early enough and would 
declaring them any earlier have made a difference?  Was the message of the impending storm 
conveyed with the necessary volume and intensity?  Was the special needs population adequately 
evacuated? Were there any successes in the evacuation process that can be studied as a positive 
example?  Lastly, should city officials have known Katrina could happen and should they have 
been better prepared?  All of these questions are essential to determining what went wrong in the 
Katrina evacuation, and each help to answer a specific area of failure.  The hope is that by 
knowing the answer to these questions, government officials at all levels can better prepare for 
hurricanes and prevent the loss of human life. 
In order to better understand why he made the decisions he did, it is essential to 
understand the background of former New Orleans Mayor, Ray Nagin.  Ray Nagin was not a 
typical mayor.  Born to a low-income family in New Orleans in 1956, he worked his way to a 
degree in Accounting from Tuskegee University and a Masters of Business Administration from 
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Tulane University.8  With this education, he climbed the corporate ladder to become the Vice-
President of Cox Communications, where he gained business experience he would try to use as 
Mayor of New Orleans.9 
Nagin although a Republican for most of his life, ran as a Democrat in the New Orleans 
mayoral race of 2002.10  This was interesting because Nagin was a known supporter of President 
Bush, and a contributor to his campaign.11  He also supported Republican Bobby Jindal for 
Governor in 2003.12  The Republican support was not one directional however, in his mayoral 
race, Nagin received much support from both parties. 
In his campaign, Nagin made it a promise, if elected to run the city government more like 
a business, a model he was used to and thought would be beneficial for the city of New 
Orleans.13  He vowed to cut corruption and waste, both noble causes, as well as to develop a plan 
to run the city more efficiently. 
The plan to run the city as a business, as well as Mayor Nagin’s apparent desire to appeal 
to both sides are possible explanations for the failures that will be outlined in the ensuing pages 
of this report.  While these traits are certainly not entirely to blame, and the idea of running a 
government like a business is not always a bad idea, it is clear that these mindsets hampered 
Mayor Nagin’s ability to make decisions that would fully evacuate the city of New Orleans.  
This is particularly so because they caused him to fear the economic and political repercussions 
                                                           
8 Andrew Stevens, “Ray Nagin former mayor of New Orleans,” City Mayors, August 24, 2017. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Ray Nagin For Mayor,” bestofneworleans.com, last modified January 22, 2002. 
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as well as the legal liabilities that would follow a mandatory evacuation if Katrina missed his 
city.  
Hurricane Katrina began over the Bahamas on Tuesday, August 23rd, 2005 as Tropical 
Depression Twelve, a humble storm by comparison with wind speeds of only 35mph.14  Twelve 
quickly turned into Hurricane Katrina and struck the southeastern Florida coast on Thursday, 
August 25th, 2005 as only a shell of its future self.  The Category 1 storm produced 80mph winds 
and left six people dead as it made landfall in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.15 
Hurricane Katrina entered into the Gulf of Mexico on Friday, August 26th, 2005 and 
quickly gained strength, rising to a Category 2 storm with sustained winds of over 100mph by 
Friday night.16  The storm quickly progressed towards the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts, 
gaining in size and force as it churned in the warm waters of the Gulf, eventually reaching the 
highest ranking on the Saffir-Simpson scale as a Category 5 storm with winds nearing 200mph.17 
Early in the morning around 6:00 on Monday, August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina 
slammed into the Mississippi cost near Gulfport, only 65 miles from New Orleans, as a strong 
Category 3 storm with sustained winds around 125mph and a storm surge of up to 28 feet.18  As 
would be discovered in the ensuing weeks and months, Katrina in her wake left over $100 billion 
in damages and close to 2,000 dead in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.  These 
                                                           
14 Associated Press, “Storm Watch,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 24, 2005. 
15 See: Jill Barton, “Katrina batters south Florida; 2 killed,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 26, 2005.  
John Pain, “Six killed as Katrina lashes south Florida,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 27, 2005. 
16 Mark Schlelfstein, “Local officials gear up as storm creeps in Gulf,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 
27, 2005. 
17 Bruce Nolan, “Preparing For The Worst,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 28, 2005. 
18 Kim Ann Zimmermann, “Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage & Aftermath,” Live Science, August 27, 2015. 
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numbers are close to unprecedented in United States hurricane history with Katrina being the 
costliest and one of the deadliest since records have been kept.19 
 In the years since Katrina, New Orleans and the entire Gulf coast region has seen a 
tremendous resurgence.  A city that once appeared as though it might never recover is a booming 
hub of the South once again.  New Orleans’ rich culture and traditions are thriving in the post-
Katrina era.  The journey back has not been easy but many would say it was worth it.  One 
citizen likened it to a forest fire, although the fire may be damaging initially, the forest comes out 
better in the long run.20  Much like a burned forest, New Orleans is better off in the long run, 
houses are now more stable, levees and floodwalls are better engineered, infrastructure has 
improved, and the city’s beloved NFL team the Saints even won a Super Bowl, something that 
has an unexplainable significance to the people of New Orleans.21  
Declaring the Evacuation 
 Evacuations, to be effective must be declared a certain amount of time before a hurricane 
makes landfall.  Several hundred thousand people simply cannot be evacuated in a short amount 
of time.  Deciding when to declare that evacuation however, is a delicate balancing act for city 
officials.  Call it too early and there is the risk the storm takes another direction and the 
evacuation ends up being needlessly costly and inconvenient.  Call the evacuation too late and 
citizens might not be able to get out in time, and their lives will be in jeopardy.  Many things 
must be taken into consideration when government officials are faced with declaring an 
evacuation, they want to be certain the storm is going to strike while still allowing enough time 
                                                           
19 “Hurricane Katrina,” HISTORY.com, 2009. 
20 Steve Zimmer (New Orleans resident and recovery expert) in discussion with the author, May 2017. 
21 Ibid. 
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to evacuate the entire population.  Mayor Nagin was faced with this same balancing act as 
Hurricane Katrina barreled towards New Orleans in 2005.  He did not declare the evacuation 
soon enough and cost many people their lives. 
 Hurricane Katrina, then Tropical Depression Twelve, was first reported in The Times-
Picayune, New Orleans’ local paper, on Wednesday, August 24th, five days before it made 
landfall on the Gulf coast, in an Associated Press article complete with a graphic showing the 
projected path of the storm.22  This was an image that all New Orleanians would have been able 
to see and surely someone in the mayor’s office, if not the mayor himself would have seen.  In 
the projected path, and cone of uncertainty, the bubble around the path that includes anywhere 
the storm might strike, of then Tropical Depression Twelve was the city of New Orleans.  This 
certainly would not have been a reason to take any drastic actions, as the storm was small and 
still on the eastern side of Florida, however one would expect a mayor would make a note of this    
Figure 1       23                       Figure 2                                                  24 
and begin to pay very close attention to this storm.  The following day, The Times-Picayune ran 
another graphic of then Tropical Storm Katrina that still showed New Orleans on the edge of the 
                                                           
22 Associated Press. 
23 Associated Press.  This is the graphic that appeared in the 8-24-05 edition of The Times-Picayune, the line at the 
top that reads “Position of storm Friday at 10 p.m.”  is a typo, Tuesday should be substituted for Friday. 
24 Pain.  This is the graphic that appeared in the 8-25-05 edition of The Times-Picayune.  
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cone of uncertainty.25  While New Orleans was not being looked at as the location of landfall for 
Katrina at that time, it was still being reported as a possibility, and competent city officials would 
have maintained a sense of alertness to the potential path of the storm. 
 New Orleans appeared to be out of the cone of uncertainty, albeit still on the fringes of it, 
by late night on Thursday, August 25th as the storm was passing over south Florida.  Early 
reports on Friday morning kept New Orleans 
barely in the cone but had the projected path 
of Katrina pointed at the panhandle of 
Florida.26  This direction did not last long 
however, the new projection that came out at 
10:00 pm CDT on the Friday before the 
storm, had New Orleans projected as the 
direct target of this growing hurricane.27            Figure 3                                                                 28 
It is at this time, 56 hours out from the eventual landfall, that Mayor Nagin should have begun to 
make the decisions that would save the lives of his citizens.  It was not necessary to declare any 
evacuations at that very moment but preparations should have begun to do such a thing very 
soon.   
In reference to this very forecast, Mayor Nagin, in his hearing before the United States 
Senate on February 1st, 2006, claimed that “On Saturday, August 27th, the models, the forecast 
                                                           
25 Pain.   
26 Forecast map released at 10:00 am CDT on 8-26-05 by the National Weather Service (NWS) and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
27 Forecast map released at 10:00 pm CDT on 8-26-05 by the National Weather Service (NWS) and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
28 Ibid. 
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models started to converge. Showing the path of the Category 3 storm had changed, and placing 
New Orleans in the middle of the projected cone.”29  This was an inaccurate statement as the 
forecast had New Orleans directly in the crosshairs of the storm Friday night as opposed to 
“starting” on Saturday.  Whether this was intentionally inaccurate or a lapse in memory one 
cannot know, in either case however, it indicates that if the mayor recalled New Orleans not 
being in the path of the storm until Saturday, there must not have been any significant action 
taken Friday night or Saturday morning.  This is especially concerning as review has shown that 
the forecast even 48 hours out from landfall was only off by 56 nautical miles, astonishing 
accuracy as compared to historical forecasts.30 
On Saturday, the same day that Mayor Nagin reports learning that the storm was pointing 
itself towards New Orleans, others were taking action.  The White House issued a statement 
letting the press and public know that President Bush was taking the storm seriously and 
declared “an emergency exists in the State of Louisiana”.31  The president also “ordered Federal 
aid to supplement state and local response efforts in the parishes located in the path of Hurricane 
Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing.”32  While this declaration did not cover 
all the parishes in Louisiana including, for reasons unknown, Orleans Parish, it does show that 
the Federal Government, and specifically President Bush, was taking Hurricane Katrina 
seriously. 
                                                           
29 Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans: Hearing on Hurricane Katrina Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of C. Ray 
Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana). 
30 Alex Kirlik, “Lessons Learned from the Design of the Decision Support System Used in the Hurricane Katrina 
Evacuation Decision” (presentation, Proceedings of the HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 51st 
ANNUAL MEETING, 2007). 
31 George W. Bush, “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana, August 27, 2005,” from Office of 
the Press Secretary. 
32 Ibid. 
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As previously highlighted, evacuations take a significant amount of time to be carried 
out.  Because, thankfully, a full-scale evacuation of a major city is not a regular occurrence it is 
understandable that the mayor of a major American city would not instinctively know how long 
it would take to empty their city of its residents.  Fortunately, however experts draft plans, often 
based on extensive studies that help officials to make these decisions with an informed mind.  
Hurricane Pam was one of these such plans.  Developed as a study in July of 2004, Hurricane 
Pam was a simulation between the Federal Government and the city of New Orleans of what 
would happen in the event a Category 3 or 4 storm directly struck the city.33 Orleans Parish, 
where New Orleans is located was one of the parishes included in the simulation.34  The entire 
reason for conducting this extensive study was to develop a plan that could be followed in the 
event that a storm of great magnitude hit New Orleans, a storm much like Katrina.  One of the 
findings in Pam, very relevant to the evacuation process was that the evacuation of the city could 
take as much as 72 hours.35  The storm was 56 hours out from New Orleans when it was certain 
that the city was going to be struck, if the recommendations from Hurricane Pam were to be 
taken seriously then at that time, the city was already behind schedule by 21 hours.  Hurricane 
Pam indicated that evacuation procedures needed to begin immediately upon the release of that 
forecast.  In addition to the Hurricane Pam plan, the State of Louisiana plan called for evacuation 
procedures to begin 50 hours ahead of landfall,36 which in the case of Hurricane Katrina would 
have been 4:00 am on Saturday the 27th.  The voluntary evacuation for the city of New Orleans 
as declared by Mayor Nagin did not go into effect until 5:00 pm on the 27th and the mandatory 
                                                           
33 Select Bipartisan Comm. To Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 
109-377, at. 81-83 (2006). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Susan B. Glasser, and Michael Grunwald, “The Steady Buildup to a City’s Chaos: Confusion Reigned At Every 
Level of Government,” Washington Post (2005)  
36 Schlelfstein. 
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evacuation was not declared until 11:00 am on the 28th, 37 and 19 hours before landfall 
respectively.  While studies and prepared plans can often be outdated or based on information 
not relevant to the situation at hand, software that uses current information and real-time analysis 
does not suffer from these same issues.  HURREVAC, which stands for Hurricane Evacuation, is 
government-funded software available to cities around the county, that based on current 
information and real-time analysis, calculates when an evacuation must be declared to ensure 
that all citizens evacuate.37 This software is interesting and effective in that it calculates its 
evacuation times based on the time that tropical storm force winds reach the city, as it is deemed 
unsafe to travel in those conditions.38  New 
Orleans had access to and used this software 
in the planning stage ahead of Hurricane 
Katrina.39  The HURREVAC software, 
assuming that the city would take a direct 
hit, which it came very close to doing,               Figure 4                                                                              40 
recommended that the evacuation decision be made at 4:00 am CDT on Saturday the 27th, or 50 
hours ahead of landfall.41  The screenshot shown in figure 4 is what the HURREVAC software 
would have looked like at 10:00 pm on Friday when the infamous forecast was released.  
If the mayor was using these studies and the HURREVAC software to aid in his decision 
making, it appears as though the information they were giving him was being ignored.  The 
mayor declared the voluntary evacuation 13 hours after the recommendation of HURREVAC as 
                                                           
37 Kirlik. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  HURREVAC software as it would have looked to the officials in New Orleans including Mayor Nagin.  
Note that times in the screenshot are Eastern. 
41 Ibid. 
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well as the State of Louisiana plan, and the mandatory evacuation 31 hours after the 
recommended time.  Furthermore, the declaration for the voluntary evacuation came 35 hours 
after the time recommended by Hurricane Pam and the mandatory evacuation came 53 hours 
late.  To his credit the earliest an informed evacuation could have been declared was at the time 
of the forecast at 10:00 pm on Friday, however the evacuations did not come until 32 and 49 
hours later.  Clearly there was evidence and recommendations to call for an evacuation of the 
city at an earlier time than was done. This extra time would have been a great benefit to those 
families that could evacuate themselves and an even greater benefit to those that relied on the 
City Government to ensure their safety and survival.  The fact that the evacuation was declared 
much later than recommended surely cost people their lives.42 
Not all parties that had to make evacuation decisions waited as late as Mayor Nagin to do 
so.  Oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico began their evacuations on Friday, the same day that the storm 
made its shift towards New Orleans.43  Private businesses often have a negative image of putting 
an emphasis on profit above everything else, governments on the other had should not be making 
any profit and therefore have no reason to risk lives in a situation such as a Hurricane.  However, 
in the instance of Hurricane Katrina, quite the opposite took place as reported by The Times-
Picayune, ChevronTexaco Corp, had all of their evacuations in the Gulf complete by Saturday 
evening, around the same time the mayor was asking the residents of New Orleans to begin 
theirs.  Furthermore, Royal Dutch-Shell, British Petroleum, and ExxonMobil Corp all had 
                                                           
42 Also of note is that the National Weather Service declared the Hurricane Watch for New Orleans 40 hours ahead 
of landfall, 2 hours earlier than the voluntary evacuation.  They also declared the Hurricane Warning 27 hours ahead 
of landfall, 8 hours earlier than the mandatory evacuation.  Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. 
Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005, special report prepared at the request of 
the National Hurricane Center, December 2005, 36. 
43 Staff “Oil firms evacuate platforms for storm,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 27, 2005. 
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conducted their evacuations by Saturday.44  It is worth noting that not a single report of a death 
on an oil rig during Katrina could be found.  This goes to show that these private industries were 
willing to risk the loss of significant amounts of income in order to ensure the safety of their 
workers, something the city of New Orleans failed to do. 
In examining the evacuation procedures that took place before Hurricane Katrina, it is 
beneficial to examine other hurricanes from the past of significant size and destruction.  Three 
hurricanes that immediately come to mind are Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Floyd.  These 
hurricanes made landfall as a Category 4, 5, and 3 respectively while all creating over $10 billion 
in damage in 2017 dollars with Andrew’s damages reaching upwards of $45 billon.  One thing 
that makes these hurricanes different from Katrina however, is that their death tolls by 
comparison are significantly lower with Floyd’s being the highest at 72.45 
What was done differently before these storms that resulted in less loss of life, than was 
done in the leadup to Katrina?  Hurricane Floyd which struck the coasts of North and South 
Carolina in 1999 is the shining example of proactive action amongst these three storms.  
Officials, in the leadup to Floyd declared a voluntary evacuation 43.5 hours before landfall and 
issued the mandatory evacuation just a few hours later, 38.5 hours before landfall.  Hugo, which 
struck Charleston, South Carolina in 1989 and Andrew which made landfall just south of Miami, 
Florida in 1992 both declared their voluntary evacuations later than New Orleans did for Katrina 
at 25 and 35 hours respectively.  However, the mandatory evacuation for Andrew came at 23 
                                                           
44 Jaquetta White, “Firms close oil rigs in Gulf,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA), Aug. 28, 2005. 
45 See: Earl J. Baker, “Evacuation decision making and public response in Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina,” 
University of South Florida Scholar Commons, (1990): 1-14., Kristin Dow, and Susan L. Cutter, “Emerging 
Hurricane Evacuation Issues: Hurricane Floyd and South Carolina,” Natural Hazards Review, (2002): 12-18., Post, 
Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., HURRICANE ANDREW ASSESSMENT – FLORIDA: Review of Hurricane 
Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information Dissemination, special report prepared at the request of United 
States Army Corps. of Engineers South Atlantic Division, and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region, 
January 1993, 5,1-6,5. 
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hours out, 4 hours sooner than Katrina, and the one for Hugo came one hour later than Katrina at 
18 hours out.46  These statistics in and of themselves do not indicate that there was a huge 
blunder committed in New Orleans, as these evacuation times, with the exception of Hugo are 
not that different than the ones seen before Katrina.  However, when examined a little more 
closely, a significant fact stands out.   
Mayors, or whoever the city has designated the responsibility to, typically declare a 
voluntary evacuation when they know that their city is in the path of a storm.  The mandatory 
evacuation signals urgency that staying in the city could very well result in the loss of life, and 
also in many localities, allows the city to begin exercising certain powers not available under 
normal circumstances.  Voluntary evacuations for this reason serve as a heads up for citizens so 
that they can begin to make arrangements and prepare for a coming mandatory evacuation.  For 
this reason, it is striking to see that New Orleans let 18 hours pass between the voluntary and 
mandatory evacuations.  By comparison to the storms previously mentioned, only 12, 7, and 5 
hours passed between the two, in the order of Andrew, Hugo, and Floyd.  With the declaration of 
a voluntary evacuation a city and in the case of New Orleans, Mayor Nagin, admits that a danger 
is coming and staying in place is dangerous.  Therefore, once this evacuation has been declared, 
a responsible mayor should soon follow it with a mandatory evacuation, the only type of 
evacuation that many people will truly listen to and the type that gives the city the power to assist 
in evacuating residents.  Mayor Nagin however waited 18 hours after the declaration of the 
voluntary evacuation to declare a mandatory one.  For stubborn persons and those without means 
to evacuate, this amount of time may have very well cost them their lives. 
                                                           
46 Ibid. 
Hardin 14 
 
 All of this information begs the question, why didn’t Mayor Nagin call for a mandatory 
evacuation sooner?  In his hearing before the Unites States Senate, Mayor Nagin is asked a 
question by Senator Susan Collins of Maine that seeks to answer this question.  She set her 
question up by stating “The evidence suggests to me that the delay between when you made the 
decision and when the order was actually issued, was caused by your staff debating such issues 
as whether nursing homes and hotels and hospitals should be included, how the order should be 
enforced, and other pretty fundamental issues.”47  She then asked the mayor “Shouldn’t those 
kinds of questions have been worked out in advance?”48  This question and its setup is key to 
understanding what took so long.  Mayor Nagin in his response claimed that he was trying to sort 
through the legal issues and his staff was working to make certain that they had the legal 
authority to declare a mandatory evacuation and that doing so would not create any other 
problems.  Also, in his testimony, Mayor Nagin admitted that he made the decision that a 
mandatory evacuation was necessary “probably around 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock in the afternoon” on 
Saturday the 27.49  This was 15 hours before the evacuation was actually declared at 11:00 the 
next morning, a critical 15 hours that would have almost doubled the amount of time available 
between the declaration of the evacuation and landfall. 
 A paraphrase of one of the mayor’s quotes, touching on this same topic, found in the 
Sunday, August 28th edition of The Times-Picayune reads “Nagin said late Saturday that he’s 
having his legal team staff look into whether he can order a mandatory evacuation of the city, a 
step he’s been hesitant to so because of the potential liability on the part of the city for closing 
hotels and other businesses.”50  Both of these examples point to the reason that the mandatory 
                                                           
47 Statement of C. Ray Nagin. 
48 Ibid, 21. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Nolan. 
Hardin 15 
 
evacuation came at such a delayed time was the fact that the mayor was too concerned about 
having the “legalese” as he referred to it,51 in order before making the declaration.  Nagin didn’t 
want the city to be held financially accountable by private businesses for lost revenue nor did he 
want to overstep his bounds and make a statement that he was concerned he didn’t have the legal 
authority to make.52  
 All of this information is only critical of the mayor if it can be shown that the delay in 
calling for a mandatory evacuation order had a tangible effect on the ability or willingness of the 
citizens of New Orleans to get out.  The point has been made several times that a mandatory 
evacuation could motivate people like a voluntary one could not.  A study conducted in 1990 
after Hurricane Hugo sought to answer the question of whether or not the word mandatory has an 
effect on the willingness of people to evacuate.  The study found that 89% of those that claimed 
they had heard an order to evacuate did so compared to only 70% who said to have heard only a 
recommendation.53  19% may not seem like a lot but in a city of almost 500,000 people, 19% is 
around 95,000.  This study shows those 95,000 would remain in harm’s way under a voluntary 
evacuation but if under a stronger type of order would evacuate.  This study further examined 
this phenomenon by referencing hypothetical surveys conducted prior to the landfall of Hugo.  
These surveys showed that only between 1% - 4% of the residents in the area affected by Hugo 
would refuse to evacuate even if ordered to do so.54   
Another study conducted after Hurricane Floyd found that one of the top influencers in 
the decision as to evacuate were “mandatory orders” along with storm severity and landfall 
                                                           
51 Statement of C. Ray Nagin. 
52 See: Nolan., and H.R. Rep. No. 109-377. 
53 Baker, 8. 
54 Ibid, 11. 
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location.55  A third study conducted after Hurricane Andrew that examined traffic flow out of the 
area before the storm, makes a statement that also supports this idea of mandatory evacuations 
having a greater impact, “The graphs show some evacuation taking place even before 6:00 am 
(time of mandatory evacuation) on Sunday in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties, but they 
show an immediate more pronounced response as soon as the official evacuation order took 
effect.”56 This statement of fact also points to the idea that yes some people will evacuate before 
the mandatory evacuation takes place but many will wait.  One of the conclusions drawn by the 
Hugo study summarizes this phenomenon perfectly “more would have (evacuated) but did not 
believe that officials had order them to do so.”57  All of this statistical information clearly points 
to the fact that the word mandatory before evacuation has a tangible impact on the number of 
people who will get out.  Further emphasizing that the mayor’s delay in calling for a mandatory 
evacuation left people in the path of the storm who would not have been there had the order 
come sooner. 
 This is only one effect of many of waiting until Saturday morning to call for a mandatory 
evacuation.  Another significant and eye opening effect of this delay is the fact that the call for 
the mandatory evacuation order did not make it into New Orleans’ local newspaper, The Times-
Picayune until the Monday, August 29th edition.58  Hurricane Katrina made landfall at 6:00 am 
on Monday the 29th.  If one was relying on The Times-Picayune to alert them as to when the 
evacuation order was issued, they would have heard the 125mph winds and seen the rising 
floodwaters before reading this information.  This delay also had an impact on the 
procrastinators of New Orleans in the fact that at the same time the mandatory evacuation was 
                                                           
55 Dow, 14. 
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ordered, so was a curfew, set at dusk on the 28th.59  This in and of itself was not a bad thing, the 
curfew came around the time that the Tropical Storm force winds were scheduled to arrive and 
make travel highly dangerous.  However, the late evacuation order paired with the curfew only 
provided an 11-hour window to leave the city.  If a citizen was the most extreme type of 
procrastinator and had not even begun to prepare for evacuation, this amount of time was 
drastically small to be able to escape from danger. 
 These issues previously mentioned are only important to citizens with their own means to 
evacuate.  However, this delay also significantly affected, possibly even to a greater degree those 
in New Orleans who did not have a way to evacuate themselves.  100,000 or approximately 20% 
of New Orleans residents did not have their own means of transportation60 and in order to get out 
of harm’s way needed the city to provide for them a means to leave.  The city’s plan called for 
them to provide buses out of the city to those with a lack of transportation61 however once the 
mandatory evacuation had been declared the majority of the drivers for those buses had already 
left.62 One specific instance of this is noted in the House of Representatives Report where it 
reads “at least one nursing home had been unable to evacuate its patients prelandfall because it 
could not find bus drivers by the time the mandatory evacuation order was issued.”63  Those that 
were qualified to drive the buses heard the voluntary evacuation notice and in the 18 hours that 
passed between the two evacuation orders, left the city out of concern for their own safety.  This 
caused there to not be enough drivers for the buses available to transport the needy to safety and 
resulted in many losing their life. 
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 It is clear that the evacuations were not declared early enough and cost people their lives.  
While a case, albeit a weak one, can be made that the voluntary evacuation did come at an early 
enough time there is not a similar case to be made in respect to the mandatory evacuation.  It was 
clearly delivered too late to be fully effective and had far reaching consequences.  Had it been 
issued sooner, it would have made a difference and saved countless lives. 
Communication 
 For citizens of a city to evacuate ahead of a hurricane they must first know that a 
hurricane is bearing down upon their city and must know how strong and dangerous the storm is.  
Without scientists to develop accurate predictions, government officials to make informed 
decisions, and journalist to convey the message, people would have no idea that a storm was 
headed their way or what actions they needed to take.  An essential aspect of evacuation 
procedure is the conveying of the message that a dangerous storm is coming and residents need 
to evacuate.  To this regard, Hurricane Katrina was no different than any other storm.  For the 
evacuation to be effective, the citizens of New Orleans had to know that the storm was coming 
and exactly how dangerous it was.  Many people and entities responsible for conveying this 
message did an excellent job, others did not.   
New Orleans’ local paper, The Times-Picayune cannot be blamed for the lack of 
communication of the threat that Hurricane Katrina posed.  From the first day that the storm 
developed over the Bahamas, The Times-Picayune carried information on it complete with a map 
showing the forecasted path.64  The paper carried this information every day until the storm 
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struck and beginning on Saturday the 27th, the day after the shift towards New Orleans took 
place, carried the information on the front page of the 
paper.65  Subscribers to the paper and those who bought 
it at the stand had the ability to stay informed and see 
its projected path regardless of the lack of information 
coming from city officials and the mayor.  All that the 
citizens who were not subscribers had to do, once the 
Figure 5                                                                                                   66  storm made the front page, to realize the danger that 
they were in was pass a paper box or newsstand.  Not only did the paper repeatedly run the story 
but they also sought expert information and graphics to publish in order that the citizens of New 
Orleans would be fully informed.  One specific example of this came when the paper reached out 
to Ivor van Heerden, a hurricane expert at Louisiana State University (LSU), for the rights to 
publish his storm surge model, shown in Figure 5, that indicated New Orleans would flood.67  
For these reasons, The Times-Picayune should be applauded, it reached countless residents of the 
doomed city and conveyed the message that a devastating storm was on its way. 
 LSU as has already been alluded to was another positive example of how to spread the 
message of an impending storm.  In addition to providing the storm surge map to The Times-
Picayune,68 the Hurricane Center at LSU also sent the map to other media sources, state and 
local officials, and posted it on the internet for the entire public to see.69  Furthermore, staff at the 
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LSU Hurricane Center reached out, as early as Saturday, to officials with the information that 
Katrina could be so powerful that it would cause some of the levees to fail.70  These actions show 
that the experts at Louisiana State were taking Hurricane Katrina very seriously and were doing 
what they could to make sure as many residents evacuated as possible, if only the mayor had 
been doing the same thing, the aftermath of Katrina might not have been as bad. 
 For all of his failures in other areas, the mayor did use many third parties effectively in 
helping to spread the news and encourage people to evacuate.  Unfortunately, once many of 
these efforts began, it was too late or for the ones that did start early, the lack of a mandatory 
evacuation rendered them ineffective.  One good idea that the city had but appeared to be mostly 
ineffective was to use pastors as a conduit for conveying the message.  The offices of Governor 
of Louisiana Kathleen Blanco and Mayor Nagin both made contact with local pastors 
encouraging them to urge their congregations to evacuate.71  However, many of these actions 
were taken on Saturday, before the mandatory evacuation was declared, and for that reason this 
idea wasn’t as successful as anticipated. 
 Another successful tactic, although not very original, that the mayor employed was the 
use of press conferences to deliver his message to as many people as possible.  Once he finally 
decided to declare the evacuations, both the voluntary and the mandatory, Mayor Nagin took to 
the podium to inform his citizens of the dangers of the storm and to urge them to evacuate.72  
While this was an action that should have been taken, and the mayor deserves some credit for 
doing so, it was not enough to counteract the delay in declaring the evacuations in the first place. 
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 One other positive thing employed by the mayor to assist in making the citizens of New 
Orleans aware that a storm was coming and that they were in danger was the New Orleans Police 
Department.  Mayor Nagin as he testified before the US Senate on February 1, 2006 sent the 
police department around the city to alert everyone the storm was coming.73  “we had all of our 
police officers to comb the city.  And they went out with their lights on, and they went 
throughout all of the neighborhoods in the city to make sure that people understood that we were 
moving toward a mandatory evacuation.”74  This was a smart and strategic tactic to use and is a 
good way to spread information, however as the mayor points out, this wasn’t done until the 
mandatory evacuation declaration which left a short amount for those citizens who had been 
alerted by the police, to get out. 
 While there were some successes, as mentioned, in the delivery of the message of 
Hurricane Katrina, there were also many things that hampered the city’s ability to fully alert their 
citizens to the coming danger.  One significant issue that arose was the confusion caused by the 
language being used by officials to describe the evacuation, as well as their apparent reluctance 
to use the word “mandatory”.  In the bipartisan House of Representatives report, this problem is 
alluded to when the various terms that were used as an alternative to “mandatory evacuation” are 
listed off, “These terms included a “precautionary” evacuation, a “voluntary” evacuation, a 
“recommended” evacuation, a “highly recommended” evacuation, and a “highly suggested” 
evacuation.”75  This is a problem because as previously addressed, the term mandatory had a 
much greater significance on the mind of citizens, and often spurs them to action much quicker.  
In a post-Katrina assessment found in the American Journal of Public Health, a survivor of the 
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storm is quoted as saying “They didn’t say it was a mandatory evacuation because if they would 
have I would have left.”76  This further underscore the point that the word mandatory is powerful 
and also alludes to another problem found in the delivery of the message, from the mayor, to 
evacuate, of confusion as to what actions should be taken.   
In that same report, survivors recalled being told to “go somewhere” but never hearing 
where to go or how they should get there.  It is important to remember that 100,000 New Orleans 
citizens did not have a car of their own77, and if they were going to evacuate it would have to be 
with the help of someone else, most likely the city.  This confusion and resulting lack of 
information led to many people remaining in their homes for the duration of the storm, and sadly, 
some lost their life as a result. 
Communication is key to governing a city, especially in the face of a catastrophe such as 
Katrina was.  While the city and Mayor Nagin did attempt many unique and useful tactics in 
relaying the message that Katrina was on her way and posing a serious threat, the holes on many 
of these tactics and lack of an earlier mandatory evacuation order rendered them mostly 
ineffective.  The confusing language and lack of specific instructions from the mayor and other 
government officials led to confusion among the citizens of New Orleans, especially those with 
the fewest means.  All of this resulted in far too many people attempting to ride out the storm in 
their homes and subsequently far too many losing their life. 
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Evacuating Special Needs Residents 
 For the majority of residents in any city and New Orleans, the responsibility to evacuate 
to safety falls on their own shoulders.  However, in any city, and especially in New Orleans, 
there will be an amount of people who for various reasons do not have the ability to evacuate 
themselves and must rely on family, friends, neighbors, or the government to ensure their 
transportation to safety.  These people are classified as “special needs” in disaster management 
and it is the responsibility of the entity declaring the evacuation, which in the case of New 
Orleans was Mayor Nagin, to ensure that they have a way of getting out.  The definition of a 
special needs person can take on many different forms.  In this category are people without their 
own source of transportation, without enough transportation for their entire family, without a 
place to go even if they can evacuate, without the financial means to evacuate, and those who 
may be too ill, elderly, or disabled to evacuate themselves.  This category of people is large and 
far-reaching but can be summed up in the idea that if someone cannot put themselves and their 
family in a car and leave the path of an oncoming storm, they are special needs. 
 New Orleans has and had a large population of citizens living on fixed government 
incomes, be it welfare, social security or something similar.78  One often overlooked and 
unfortunate characteristic of Hurricane Katrina was that it made landfall on the 29th of the month.  
At this point, these incomes had long since arrived and mostly been spent, and with gas prices 
around $3 a gallon79, driving out of the city was a very costly endeavor.  These residents who 
relied on the government to provide their income would not have been able to financially 
evacuate themselves due to this basic principle.   
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On top of those citizens who relied on the government for some or all of their income, 
there were others who were self-sustaining but still did not have the financial capabilities to 
evacuate.  Is was estimated that the minimum cost to evacuate, including gas, food, lodging, and 
other expenses was around $600.80  Based on the Federal Minimum Wage in 2005 of $5.1581 this 
$600 cost would equal almost three weeks’ worth of labor before tax deductions.  For many 
families, specifically those with only one working parent, spending 6% of the year’s total income 
on a few days of evacuation was unthinkable and impossible.  For this reason many people if not 
assisted by the government or someone else would have no choice but to remain in their homes 
while the storm wreaked havoc. 
 Another characteristic of the citizens of New Orleans, even those with means, around the 
time of Katrina was as has been mentioned, at least 100,000 of them did not have access to their 
own vehicle and often relied on public transportation to get around the city.82  This number 
correlates to around 57,000 families that without assistance could not escape the wrath of the 
storm.83  It is not uncommon for residents of a large city to forgo owning a vehicle as public 
transportation is usually more than sufficient and eliminates the hassles and expense of owing a 
car.  Reports show that city officials knew that the number of residents without their own 
transportation was high,84 and for this reason it would be expected that they would have a plan in 
place to deal with this reality, unfortunately whatever plan they might have had was insufficient.  
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 New Orleans did have somewhat of a plan to deal with this problem but it was, as is 
evidenced by the amount of people left in the city, clearly insufficient.  In attempting to 
understand why the city did not evacuate its citizens who could not evacuate themselves, it is 
important to first examine what the designed plan was prior to Katrina.  One key aspect of the 
plan, as was posted on the state website, was the use of buses to transport people out of the city, 
upon the declaration of a state of emergency by the governor.85  Furthermore, the New Orleans 
plan stated “[t]ransportation will be provided to those persons requiring public transportation 
from the area,”.86  This plan made it to where the Regional Transit Authority, the New Orleans 
bus system, would be the lead for this operation.87 
 Another aspect of the plan was a program that Mayor Nagin called “Operation Brother 
Keeper.”88  This was a “buddy system” designed in a way that through the faith-based 
communities, citizens would be encouraged to evacuate or assisted in evacuating.89  This was 
based off the principle “neighbors helping neighbors” and was built around the strong 
community structures found in New Orleans.90  
 While the plan to evacuate citizens using buses was sufficient in theory, there were many 
aspects of it in reality that were either impractical or poorly executed.  One aspect of the plan as 
previously mentioned, suffered as a result of the late mandatory evacuation declaration.  Because 
of this delay, there were not enough qualified bus drivers left in the city to operate the buses.91  
Another issue that arose with this plan was that even when there were buses available and 
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citizens that wanted to evacuate on them, it was often difficult for the citizens to know where 
these buses would be located.92  Some citizens even reported after the fact that they never saw a 
bus in their neighborhood, and for those that did, many of them were elderly or were with 
someone elderly and unable to walk to the bus.93  This inability to access the buses that were 
available is a glaring problem in the city’s plan that resulted in many not evacuating. 
 An image that spread rapidly across the news in the days after Katrina was one of school 
buses parked in a lot and flooded with water, when addressing this in his Senate hearing, Mayor 
Nagin pointed out that those buses were not under his jurisdiction.94  Nagin stated under oath, 
“Those buses were the School Board buses, and they pretty much coordinated those efforts.”95  
While the mayor cannot be blamed for not utilizing these buses as one, he didn’t have the power 
over them, and two there would not have been any drivers for them regardless, it is unfortunate 
that the city’s plan did not have a way to make use of them for evacuation purposes. 
 While the issues just mentioned made it difficult for citizens to board buses, there were 
some people who actually did make it onto a bus.  However, this did not guarantee that they 
would make it out of harm’s way.  New Orleans City Councilwoman Cynthia Hedge-Morrell 
said that the original intention to evacuate special needs residents out of the city via buses was 
changed when it was realized that traffic was heavy and a decision was made by city officials to 
“send the people on the buses somewhere closer to wait out the storm.”96  This decision results in 
tens of thousands of citizens of New Orleans stranded in shelter across the city not only during 
the storm but for days afterwards.  Why this decision was made was bizarre to Chip Johnson, 
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chief of emergency operation in Avoyelles Parish, located in central Louisiana.  Johnson, after 
reiterating that the plan called for the buses to leave New Orleans stated, “In Avoyelles alone, 
there was room for at least 200 or 300 more on Sunday night before the storm, and more shelters 
could have been opened if necessary.”97  This is just one example that goes to show that the 
decision to shelter instead of evacuate was unnecessary as there were places to take the special 
needs residents that would have removed them from a flooded city.   
Much like the plan to utilize buses for evacuation had many issues that rendered it mostly 
ineffective, the “Operation Brother Keeper” also had several holes in it.  In a follow-up question 
to the mayors hearing that was mailed to him after the fact, Senator Tom Coburn of Maryland 
asked the mayor “what oversight was given to whether or not people involved with the “buddy 
system” were actually able to get people to safety?”98  Mayor Nagin gave very brief written 
answer to this question that indicates very little oversight or thought was actually put into this 
program.  His answer reads “Contacted everyone the night before and dist. [sic] via video.”99  
The Senator also asked if there was any training done prior to Katrina with those who would be 
implementing this operation but that question goes entirely unanswered by the mayor.100 
 For all of the holes in the plan that existed, the greatest issue with New Orleans’ plan for 
its special needs residents was the fact there wasn’t much of a plan to begin with.  In his hearing 
before the US Senate, Mayor Nagin described the process of trying to workout agreements with 
different organizations and companies such as “the Regional Transit Authority or the School 
Board or some paddle-wheel boats”101 to provide transportation out of the city for special needs 
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residents.  When asked by Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut why these deals didn’t get done 
and these resources were not available,102 Nagin replies “Well, I think, you know, putting 
together those types of agreements, you know, are a little complex in our particular area.”103   
This response shows the incompetence of the mayor, of course these agreements are complex, 
that is why they have been given to the highest and most powerful person in the city.  If Mayor 
Nagin was not going to be able to make them work than who else would be able to?  Clearly, as 
is evidenced by these statements there was no significant plan in place and what plan was in 
place did not have the resources needed to be properly executed.  Nagin stated in reference to 
working on transportation agreements, “We were trying to make sure the we had every tool 
available in our tool box [sic] that we felt we needed in the event of an emergency.”104  
Unfortunately though for the special needs citizens of New Orleans, the mayor’s toolbox was 
empty. 
 Although the city only had the basics of an evacuation plan for their special needs 
residents, had a few things been done differently drastically different results may have been 
observed.  Had the city not reversed their original plan, and instead bused their residents to 
shelters outside of the city, there would have been significantly less suffering in overcrowded, 
hot, and underequipped shelters in the city, surrounded by toxic floodwaters, and more people in 
proper shelters outside of the flood zone.  Furthermore, had the mandatory evacuation been 
delivered sooner, it would have been easier to get residents onto the buses and get those buses 
out of New Orleans.  A longer amount of time to prepare for an evacuation would have helped 
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people, both special needs citizens, and officials sort out the logistics of evacuating and would 
have most certainly seen more people leave New Orleans.105   
One final thing, although there are certainly more, that begs mentioning is the fact that 
officials did not take Amtrak up on their offer to move special needs residents out of New 
Orleans.106  According to Amtrak, they ran a train out of New Orleans on Saturday night at 8:30 
carrying equipment to safety, they offered the city the option of placing hundreds of citizens on 
this train bound for high ground in Mississippi.107  However, city officials declined this option 
and the train left with only the extra equipment onboard.108  Mayor Nagin in his Senate 
testimony had a different recollection of an offer from Amtrak.  He remembered the company 
offering to take individuals to Hammond, Louisiana which was approximately 60 miles outside 
of New Orleans.  However, the mayor felt that that was not far enough away and “wouldn’t be 
sufficient for evacuation purposes.”109  If the mayor is correct and this is the offer that Amtrak 
made, it is still hard to imagine why being 60 miles outside of the city was not better than being 
left in the middle of New Orleans.  No matter which side is telling the truth, and it is possible 
that both of them are, it is incomprehensible that the mayor would not have allowed Amtrak to 
take at least some of his citizens to a safer location further inland.  For some people 60 miles 
could have made the difference between life and death. 
 New Orleans’ special needs citizens were the most vulnerable during Hurricane Katrina.  
They had no way to evacuate the city on their own and due to multiple failures by the city 
officials in New Orleans, and Mayor Nagin himself, they had no way to evacuate at all.  With a 
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large population of special needs citizens, caring for and evacuating them should have been a top 
priority of the city.  While certain plans were in place, they were mostly ineffective and few.  
The residents of New Orleans suffered a great tragedy due to a lack of planning and caring for 
the citizens who needed it most. 
What Went Right 
 Although the evacuation process in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina appeared to 
be and was a disaster, not everything about it was bad, there were a few things that did city did 
well and should be reflected on as a positive lesson to take away.  The top success in the 
evacuation was the use of contraflow.  Contraflow is where the inbound lanes of an interstate or 
highway are reversed to become outbound lanes.  For example, if contraflow is enacted on an 
eight-lane interstate, there would be eight 
outbound lanes as opposed to four inbound 
and four outbound.110  While average travel 
speeds of 12mph may sound extremely 
slow, this was much better than past 
experiences, when cars sat at a standstill for 
Figure 6                                                                                  111   hours on end.112  In a 1994 study related to 
evacuation clearance times, the projected amount of time it would take to empty New Orleans 
was anywhere between 44 and 50 hours based on the theory that a little over 400,000 cars would 
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be involved.113  When the evacuation ahead of Katrina took place in 2005, it lasted somewhere 
between 36  and 38 hours with the estimated vehicle count somewhere around 430,000.114 
 A resident who first evacuated New Orleans ahead of Hurricane Katrina and then 
Houston ahead of Hurricane Rita, reflected on the difference in the two evacuations.  The 
success of the New Orleans contraflow is highlighted in the quote, “Our evacuation from Katrina 
was almost flawless.  We left at midday Saturday, Aug. 27, about 40 before the storm made 
landfall.  We made it in eight hours.”115  On the other hand the troubles of the Rita evacuation 
are shown when the same person writes, “It should have been a six-hour drive… for the next 10 
hours, we crept along at 1 mph.”116  This goes to show that in all of its chaos and catastrophe, 
New Orleans did the contraflow evacuation right, a large number of people were able to evacuate 
in a timely fashion.  One thing however that is important to remember about contraflow, is that it 
only benefits a certain demographic of people.  Contraflow no matter how successful cannot 
benefit those without cars, or the financial means to evacuate themselves out of the city.  
Contraflow only benefits those people if the city places them on a bus and drives them out of the 
city.  This is the reason that for all of the successes of the contraflow evacuation, it was still 
insufficient, it did not allow for everyone to evacuate. 
 One other success that can be drawn from the Hurricane Katrina evacuation was the use 
of staged evacuations.  A staged evacuation is when the evacuation begins with those closest to 
the ocean leaving first and the communities further inland following suit soon afterwards.  This 
allows the most vulnerable groups and groups with the farthest distances to cover to get the 
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earliest start and helps to prevent congestion on the evacuation route.117  This process did see 
some success prior to Katrina but much like contraflow, only benefits those with the means to 
evacuate themselves, and is of no benefit to special needs residents. 
 Staged evacuations and contraflow are two positives that should be remembered from 
Hurricane Katrina.  These are examples that show not every action the City Government and 
Mayor Nagin took had a negative impact on the ability of New Orleans residents to get out of the 
city.  These, unlike most aspects of the evacuation should be studied as a positive and reused by 
other city governments facing a destructive hurricane.  One example of this in action was when 
in 2016, in order to evacuate ahead of Hurricane Matthew, all lanes of Interstate 26 in South 
Carolina were shifted to outbound from Charleston to Columbia.  This proved to be effective in 
moving the residents of those coastal communities to safety.  However, as these procedures are 
praised, it is important to remember that in order for an evacuation to be fully effective, all 
citizens of a city must have the opportunity to flee to safety, not just those with their own source 
of transportation. 
Was There a Warning? 
 One important question that must be answered when attempting to determine whether or 
Mayor Nagin is culpable for the poor evacuation process prior to Katrina is whether or not he 
had any reason to believe that a storm like Katrina could happen and that it could flood the city.  
Had the mayor not had any reason to believe that Katrina was possible then a lack of planning 
and preparation would be understandable, although still slightly concerning.  However, if it can 
be shown that the mayor had reason to believe that a storm like Katrina was possible and that 
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flooding like what occurred was also possible then much of the blame for the tragedy of Katrina 
must rest on his shoulders.  There were signs that Katrina was coming and evidence that New 
Orleans would flood, they were clear enough to cause panic in some people, unfortunately 
though, not the right people. 
 New Orleans as a city has from its beginning has had a difficult history with its location.  
Founded in 1718 in a crescent of the Mississippi river, New Orleans was in a perfect location to 
conduct business, just not to stay dry.118  Due to the historical flooding of the Mississippi River, 
and the sediment that it deposited, the highest ground in New Orleans is along the bank of the 
river.119  When in the city, it is interesting to observe that in order to get to the riverfront one 
must walk uphill, a phenomenon quite contrary to typical geography.  As the city moves away 
from the Mississippi, it descends downward until reaching its lowest point near the middle of the 
city, about 15 feet below the river.  On the other side of New Orleans is found Lake 
Pontchartrain, a shallow but wide estuary with a connection to the Gulf of Mexico.120  With 
water on all sides and its lowest point in the middle, the topography of New Orleans causes it to 
seem like a bowl floating in the ocean.  One wave that is too high and the entire thing will be 
filled with water, with no way out.   
 The fact that the land that is closest to the lake used to be a swamp does not make matters 
any better.  Not only is this area of New Orleans low in elevation but it is naturally soggy and 
prone to flooding.121  Further making this worse, New Orleans receives on average, 60 inches of 
rain per year.  All of these factors lead to a city that does not drain properly and is highly prone 
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to flooding.  This issue was first realized in 1719 when the city flooded and efforts began to 
make New Orleans a drier place to live.122  The first levee was completed in 1727 but did not do 
much to stop the flooding with major floods occurring three more times in the Eighteenth 
Century.123  Ever since that first levee in 1727, the city of New Orleans has continued to build 
barriers arround itself to keep the flood waters out.  As one travels around the city today, it is 
hard to miss the grassy hills and concrete walls that form the perimeter and line the countless 
canals.  These constructs of man have been designed to keep New Orleans dry, further proof that 
major flooding is just around the corner. 
 The last major flood in New Orleans prior to Katrina, came as a result of Hurricane Betsy 
in 1965.124  This storm while not as disastrous as Katrina was nicknamed “Billion Dollar Betsy” 
due to the fact its damages totaled an astonishing $1 billion in 1965.  Much like Katrina, Betsy’s 
storm surge overtopped and breached the city’s levees and flooded much of New Orleans, 
especially the lowest areas such as the 9th ward.  Unfortunately, one significant result of the 
improvements that were attempted in the wake of Betsy was the accidental segregation of the 
city.125  New Orleans much as a result of its small area, had throughout history been known as a 
highly integrated city with people of all colors, financial statuses, and cultural backgrounds 
living side-by-side.126   
With what were thought of as improvements to the city, the area in which people lived 
was able to expand.  New Orleans developed suburbs and much like in most American cities the 
more financially stable and often white residents left the city for these newly developed 
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suburbs.127  Unlike most other American cities however, the older parts of the city typically sat at 
a much lower elevation than these new suburbs.  Those that moved out, had, whether 
intentionally or not, fled to higher ground, leaving their former neighbors in the flood-zone.  This 
phenomenon resulted in those with the least ability to evacuate from Katrina in the location 
where evacuation was most needed.  Many of those who were able to evacuate lived in a location 
where the need to was not as severe.  This resulted in the fact that many of those who lost their 
lives in Katrina were poor, African-American, and many times both. 
The city’s history of flooding and the resulting segregation of New Orleans should have 
been enough to cause city officials to have on file a highly detailed and structured evacuation 
plan.  Any mayor who knew their city like a mayor should, would have known of the city’s 
history of flooding and the fact that many without the ability to evacuate were in the most 
vulnerable locations. 
Not only did New Orleans have a history of storms and flooding that should have caused 
city officials concern, there was also concern from the scientific community that showed the 
threat of a Katrina-like storm was very clear.  Ivor van Heerden, a hurricane expert at Louisiana 
State University sat down with PBS in October of 2004, a little less than a year before Hurricane 
Katrina to discuss the possibility of a storm like what Katrina turned out to be.  When asked how 
he would describe the city and its wetlands if they were a patient in the hospital, van Heerden 
said “close to death”.128  van Heerden is asked by the interviewer to describe New Orleans’ worst 
case scenario and the results of it.129  He says that in the event of a slow-moving Category 3, the 
city would be flooded with toxic waters from the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain, reaching 
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depths as high as the average home’s roof.  He also predicted that approximately 300,000 people 
would be left in the city, and would have to scramble to higher ground as the floodwaters rose 
just to survive.130  While he overestimated the number of citizens left in the city, with the actual 
number between 70,000 – 100,000, he cannot be faulted for not showing enough concern. 
Furthermore, van Heerden very accurately predicted what would happen in relation to the 
flooding.  He was correct in the statement that the hurricane’s winds would destroy property 
resulting in a release of toxins into the water which would then mix with the surge from Lake 
Pontchartrain.  The prediction that water would reach up to the roofs of the average home and 
that people would have to scramble to high ground for survival proved to be shockingly accurate 
as these images are seared into the memory of all who observed the effects of Katrina. 
When asked what the probability was of a hurricane making landfall in New Orleans and 
wreaking the kind of havoc that van Heerden was predicting, he stated “If we look in the last 
eight years, we have two near misses of New Orleans.  And as the wetlands fall apart, the 
potential of these hurricanes to do major destruction through storm surges rises and rises and 
rises.  So every year that goes by the probability of this killer storm occurring increases.”131  And 
while he didn’t make the claim that this kind of a storm would happen within the year, like it 
actually did, he did state “once every seven to eight years we’re going to have a near miss.”132  It 
was clear that this man who had dedicated himself to hurricanes and specifically ones that affect 
Louisiana, was concerned about New Orleans, unfortunately not everyone shared in his concern. 
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This, much like the letter detailed earlier, is an example of someone who knew that a 
storm like Katrina could take place and that the city was not prepared for it to happen.  They both 
expressed their concerns through different mediums but unfortunately for the citizens of New 
Orleans, were disregarded.  Why the city did not listen to either one of these experts is a mystery 
in itself but it most certainly is a combination of things.  Many in New Orleans had the feeling 
the big one would never come, and for this reason didn’t want to spend the money preparing for 
a phantom storm.  The city government and Mayor Nagin apparently did not want to invest the 
time and money into these issues133, much for the same reason the delay in the evacuation 
occurred, if a storm never struck, it would be money wasted. 
One other thing that has been mentioned in a separate context, that should have alerted 
the city to the threat of a storm like Katrina turned out to be was the Hurricane Pam exercise.  
During the exercise, scientists from LSU stated that a storm of that magnitude would overtop and 
breach the levees, leading to the flooding of much of the city.134  Furthermore, this exercise was 
designed because of New Orleans’ vulnerability to hurricanes, however the officials who took 
part in that exercise did not seem to believe that a hurricane of that magnitude and direction 
would actually hit the city.135  This is hard to imagine because if it were not for the potential of a 
major hurricane, then Hurricane Pam would have never been executed in the first place.  And to 
dismiss a hurricane expert when he or she expresses concern that levees will be breached shows 
a total disregard for science and expertise, a disregard that cost many their lives. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is important to reemphasize the point that Hurricane Katrina was 
unavoidable, the human suffering and death that occurred on the other hand was not.  There were 
many different mistakes that were made before, during, and after the storm that, had they never 
happened, the suffering would have been lessened.  The purpose of this investigation however 
was to examine the evacuation process and whether or not it was a failure.  The finding of this 
research is that it was a failure of catastrophic proportions that cost many people their lives. 
One major failure of the evacuation was Mayor Nagin’s inability to call for a mandatory 
evacuation in a timely fashion.  It was proved through many different studies and programs that 
the evacuation should have been declared much sooner than it was, and had it been, it would 
have made a difference.  Why this delay occurred can only be explained by the mayor’s own 
words.  He expressed the concern that the city and his office would be liable for any lost revenue 
by private businesses should the storm bypass New Orleans.  The mayor was concerned that if 
the storm did not strike his city, people would be upset that he had interrupted their weekend and 
forced them into spending money on an evacuation.  It became obvious through this 
investigation that the mayor was more concerned about saving his own skin, than the lives of his 
citizens.  
This delay had a tremendous and unfortunate impact, many people did not take Hurricane 
Katrina as seriously as they should have, because the evacuation was not mandatory, and once it 
was declared a mandatory evacuation, the time allowed to leave was for too short for many 
residents.  This resulted in many people staying in the city that would have otherwise gotten out.  
This hesitation cannot be duplicated in any other city in the future, the consequences as have 
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been seen are too drastic, no government official should gamble with the lives of their citizens, 
regardless the cost. 
The messaging associated with the Hurricane Katrina evacuation was also investigated 
for its flaws.  Without sufficient distribution of information, the decisions made by Mayor Nagin 
would not matter.  It became clear through the research that the private entities involved in 
carrying the message of Hurricane Katrina should be applauded for the job they did.  The Times-
Picayune daily carried information on the storm, often including maps and projections provided 
by scientists at Louisiana State University, another group of people who deserve applause for 
their efforts in educating the public to Katrina’s dangers. 
While the city and Mayor Nagin had many procedures in place, some of which were 
unique and creative, to disperse the information regarding Katrina, many of them had fatal flaws.  
The use of ministers to spread the message was creative and especially tailored to the culture of 
New Orleans, unfortunately without the backing of a mandatory evacuation this tactic was not as 
successful as it could have been.  The use of the NOPD to spread the message suffered a similar 
fate, it was a good idea, but without a mandatory evacuation it did not work as well as it could 
have.  These examples get at the reason the messaging was mostly ineffective.  It was not 
because there wasn’t enough of it, that part was adequate, it was a result of a lack of strong and 
forceful language from the Mayor.  Had a mandatory evacuation been issued sooner, the 
messaging would have been much more effective.  This unfortunately resulted in many not 
taking the warnings seriously and remaining in harm’s way. 
The special needs population in New Orleans was quite possibly the greatest victim of the 
failures of the evacuation process.  Not only did these people not have the means to evacuate 
themselves, the city did not adequately provide means for them.  The city had a plan in place to 
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evacuate those who could not evacuate themselves but did not fully implement it for several 
reasons.  One main reason was that due to the delayed mandatory evacuation, the resources 
needed to carry out an evacuation of needy residents, were not available.  Furthermore, poor 
decision making on the part of city officials resulted in those who were able to get onto buses 
being taken only to shelters and not out of the city.  In all of the research conducted, no 
reasonable explanation can be found to answer why this decision was made.  There were clearly 
buses for these people yet they were only shuttled to locations still in New Orleans. 
It was one of the greatest responsibilities of New Orleans and Mayor Nagin to see that the 
special needs population was cared for.  Much like the other problems in Hurricane Katrina’s 
evacuation process, the failure to take care of these people can be traced back to the delay in 
calling for the mandatory evacuation.  Had it been called for sooner, the city’s plan could have 
been better implemented and more residents would have lived through the storm. 
In all of the failures of the evacuation process, it is important to reserve a space to 
recognize the things that went well.  There were two things New Orleans did that other cities 
would be wise to copy if found in a similar situation.  Contraflow was one of these successes, it 
allowed for an astonishing amount of people to evacuate the city and do so in a significantly 
quicker time than previously thought possible.  The staged evacuation also should be counted as 
a positive, as it was a creative way to evacuate the most vulnerable people first and prevent 
congestion on the roadways.  While it is important to celebrate these positives, it is also equally 
important to remember that they were only positive for individuals with a way to evacuate 
themselves, and did nothing to help those who did not. 
 One question that must be answered before anyone in the New Orleans Government can 
be blamed for the poor and incomplete evacuation is, did they know that a storm like Katrina 
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could happen and should they have been better prepared?  The answer to both of these questions, 
based on research is a definitive yes.  The history of New Orleans is riddled with instances of 
flooding and construction of levees to keep the water out.  This alone should be enough to cause 
concern and officials to take no risk in the event of a hurricane.  However, this was not enough 
nor was the recent memory of flooding caused by Hurricane Betsy.  And while city officials 
including the mayor, rejected the warnings of danger, experts did not.  The threat to New Orleans 
was clear to some, unfortunately they were the ones who could make a difference. 
 This disregard for history and evidence that New Orleans was not in a safe state of being 
caused there to be an insufficient amount of planning for an event like Hurricane Katrina, and a 
lackadaisical attitude towards the storm when it pointed towards the city.  This led to a failure in 
fully evacuating New Orleans’ residents and unnecessary death and suffering. 
 The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was avoidable.  The greatest difference 
would have been made if Mayor Nagin had called for the mandatory evacuation sooner.  
However, he did not and should be considered responsible for the disaster that unfolded in his 
city.  The lack of an earlier mandatory evacuation meant that for all of the reasons previously 
mentioned, New Orleans was far from empty when Katrina struck.  The goal of an evacuation 
should be to have an empty city when the hurricane makes landfall.  While blame must be placed 
on individual citizens who were able to evacuate and for various reasons chose not to, these 
people were in the minority of those left in the city.  Because of the failures of Mayor Nagin and 
others in the City Government, many never had the chance to evacuate New Orleans and these 
failures cost them their lives.136 
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from contractors who were working on the city’s rebuilding after the storm.  This information was not mentioned in 
this work because it is not relevant to the evacuation process.  However, it would be a failure of fact to omit this 
detail entirely. 
 
